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SHOULD THE COURT CHANGE THE SCOPE OF THE REMOVAL POWER? 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.1 
In this essay Professor Pierce argues that the Court should use a strict functional approach in its 
ongoing process of changing the scope of the power of the president to remove officers. He 
maintains that the Court can reconcile the potentially conflicting commands of Article II and due 
process by holding that the president must have unlimited power to remove any officer who can 
make policy decisions on behalf of the government, but that due process limits the power of the 
president to remove an officer whose sole responsibility is to adjudicate disputes between private 
parties and the government.     
Over the past century, the Supreme Court has issued a handful of opinions in which it has 
addressed the constitutional validity of statutory limits on the power of the president or those 
directly responsible to the president to remove officers of the United States. Over the last 
decade, some scholars have urged the Court to increase the scope of the president’s removal 
power notwithstanding statutory limits on that power. Proponents of such a change in scope 
argue that it is needed to allow the president to exercise effectively the powers vested in him by 
Article II of the Constitution.  
Over the last two years, the president and the Solicitor General have joined the campaign to 
expand the scope of the president’s removal power, and there are reasons to believe that a 
majority of Justices are prepared to act in ways that will increase the scope of the president’s 
power to remove officers at will. In the 1950s, however, the Court issued several well-reasoned 
opinions in which it strongly suggested that the power to remove some officers is limited by due 
process even in the absence of any statutory limit on the power to remove an officer. Any change 
in the scope of the removal power must consider both the reasons to increase the scope of the 
removal power and the reasons to decrease the scope of the power.    
This essay will suggest ways in which the Court should respond to efforts to change the scope of 
the removal power, given the potential conflict between the high value the constitution places 
on the president’s power to perform the functions of the chief executive and the high value the 
constitution places on the availability of means through which private parties can be assured of 
access to unbiased tribunals to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the federal 
government. 
In section one, I describe the Court’s opinions with respect to the permissible scope of the 
removal power and its limits. In section two, I describe the recent efforts of scholars, litigants, 
and the government to reduce the circumstances in which Congress can insulate officers from 
plenary control by the president, and the attempts by the Court in the 1950s to create judicially-
mandated limits on the removal power. In section three, I urge the Court to use a functional 
approach in determining the constitutionally appropriate scope of limits on the removal power. 
                                                          
1 Lyle T. Alverson  Professor of Law at George Washington University.  
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The Court should restrict the removal power when restrictions are required by due process and 
reject them when they interfere with the president’s responsibility for decisions with respect to 
government policy. 
I. The Precedents 
In this section I will describe the five cases in which the Court has decided whether a limit on the 
removal power is permissible. Before I embark on that task, however, it is useful to note some 
general characteristics of the decisions in the cases. First, the Court’s task is rendered difficult by 
the lack of any provision of the Constitution that specifically addresses the removal power. In the 
absence of such a provision, the Court must draw inferences with respect to the removal power 
based on the significance it attaches to provisions that have a functional relationship with the 
removal power—most notably the provisions of Article II that confer executive power on the 
president and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment that assures litigants against the 
government of access to an impartial forum. 
Second, the Court has never upheld a prohibition on exercise of the removal power with respect 
to any officer. The cases involved only the question whether a statutory limit on the removal 
power in the form of a requirement that the president or his immediate subordinate must specify 
a cause for removal is constitutionally permissible. Third, the Court has never had occasion to 
decide what “cause” would satisfy the requirement that the president state a cause for removal 
where such a limit is permissible or what, if any, evidence the president must offer to support a 
decision to remove an officer for cause. 
In its 1926 opinion in Myers v. U.S.2, the Court held that a statute “by which the unrestricted 
power of removal of first class postmasters is denied the president is in violation of the 
Constitution and invalid.” The opinion is often cited for the broad proposition that Congress 
cannot limit in any way the power of the president to remove any executive officer.  
The apparent breadth of the holding in Myers should be qualified, however, by its context. The 
statute the Court held unconstitutional required the president to obtain the consent of the 
Senate before removing any officer.3 The statute was enacted in 1867 as part of the nasty debate 
between President Johnson and Congress about how to treat the former states of the 
Confederacy after the Civil War. It was the sole basis for the successful effort of the House to 
impeach President Johnson that came within one vote of his removal from office by the Senate. 
The Myers Court devotes much of its 71 pages to unflattering descriptions of that congressional 
attempt to render President Johnson totally ineffective in his efforts to exercise the powers the 
constitution vests in the president in Article II and to transfer all executive power to the Congress.  
Thus, Myers can be interpreted much more narrowly to prohibit Congress from attempting to 
aggrandize itself by transferring executive powers to itself. As so interpreted, Myers fits well with 
                                                          
2 272 U.S. 52,176 (1926). 
3 Id. at 107. 
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modern opinions like INS v. Chadha,4 holding unconstitutional a statute that purported to 
empower Congress to veto an action taken by an agency, and Bowsher v. Synar,5 holding 
unconstitutional a statute that purported to confer executive power on an officer who could only 
be removed by Congress. The Myers Court also made it clear that it was not deciding whether 
the president must have the power to remove without cause officers who have adjudicatory 
responsibilities. 6 
In its 1935 opinion in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.,7 the Court held that Congress can limit the 
power of the president to remove some officers by requiring that the president specify a cause 
for removal. The Court distinguished Myers by interpreting it to apply only to “purely executive 
officers” and not to officers that head an agency that Congress intended to be independent of 
the executive.8 The opinion is often cited to support the proposition that Congress can create an 
agency with broad powers that is “independent” of the executive branch.  
Like the opinion in Myers, however, the opinion in Humphrey’s should be interpreted narrowly 
based on the context in which it was decided. The officer whose removal was at issue in 
Humphrey’s was one of the five Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Court 
characterized the FTC as a “quasi legislative and quasi judicial” body and analogized it to the 
Court of Claims.9  
At the time, FTC had no power to issue rules or to make policy decisions on behalf of the 
government.10 It had only the power to adjudicate disputes through use of formal evidentiary 
hearings and the power to advise Congress with respect to the need for legislation. That quasi 
legislative role was particularly important at the time. Congress lacked the staff required to 
determine whether legislation was needed to address a perceived problem and, if so, the form 
that any such legislation should take. Congress necessarily relied on the FTC to advise it with 
respect to the need to enact critically important legislation like the Federal Power Act and the 
Natural Gas Act.11 Moreover, even in the case of such a “quasi judicial” and “quasi legislative” 
body, the Court upheld only the power of Congress to require the President to state a cause for 
removing one of the five members of the tribunal that oversaw the  performance of those 
functions. 
                                                          
4 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
5 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
6 272 U.S. at 157-58. 
7 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
8 Id. at 627-28. 
9 Id. at 629. 
10In its 1973 opinion in National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F. 3d 672 (1973), the D.C. Circuit surprised 
most observers by holding that FTC has the power to issue rules even though the agency had denied that it had 
that power for decades. The court supported its holding by explaining why the power to make substantive rules 
was essential to allow an agency to make regulatory policy. Congress ratified the D.C. Circuit’s holding in 1974, by 
enacting a statute that expressly conferred rulemaking power on FTC. Magnuson Moss Warranty—Federal Trade 
Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1974).         
11 Both statutes were based on detailed FTC studies of the natural gas and electricity markets.   
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In its 1958 opinion in Wiener v. U.S.,12 the Court held that the President could not remove a 
member of the three member War Claims Tribunal without giving a cause for removal other than 
a desire to replace the Commissioner with someone of the president’s choosing. The Wiener 
opinion can be interpreted to support a proposition broader than the proposition supported by 
the Humphrey’s opinion. Congress did not purport to limit the president’s power to remove 
members of the War Claims Tribunal. The Court drew the inference that Congress intended such 
a limit based on its failure to include in the statute that created the Tribunal any provision that 
authorized the president to remove a member of the Tribunal.13 
Like the opinion in Myers and Humphrey’s, however, the opinion in Wiener should be interpreted 
narrowly based on its context. The Court emphasized that the sole function of the Tribunal was 
“to adjudicate according to law” three classes of claims that arose from U.S. activities in World 
War II.14 The Court noted that Congress could, and had, used a variety of means to adjudicate 
war claims. It could act on such claims itself; it could entrust the executive with discretion to act 
on the claims; or, it could assign the adjudication of the claims to the District Courts or to the 
Court of Claims.15  
The Court concluded that Congress also had the option that it chose in this case. It could create 
a specialized tribunal tasked only with “adjudicating according to law, that is, on the merits of 
each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal considerations.”16 The Court concluded 
that Congress intended the members of the specialized adjudicative tribunal to have the same 
kind of freedom from potential outside influences that the District Courts or the Court of Claims 
would have. It followed that the President could not remove a member of the Tribunal without 
stating a cause for removal.17 
In its 1988 opinion in Morrison v. Olson,18 a seven-Justice majority upheld the provisions of the 
Ethics in Government Act that authorized a court to appoint an independent counsel in response 
to a determination by the Attorney General that there is probable cause to believe that a high 
ranking member of the executive branch had committed a crime. Once appointed, the 
independent counsel had complete control over the investigation and potentially the prosecution 
of such a high ranking official. The independent counsel could only be removed by the Attorney 
General for cause.  
The majority acknowledged that the Court was departing from its prior functional approach to 
removal cases.19 It recognized that the functions of investigation and prosecution are executive 
                                                          
12 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
13 Id. at 352-53. 
14 Id. at 353-55. 
15 Id. at 355-56. 
16 Id. at 355. 
17 Id. at 355-56. 
18 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
19 Id. at 689-90. 
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functions rather than quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.20 It concluded that it was 
permissible for Congress to provide the independent counsel with a degree of insulation from 
control by the president because the executive functions performed by the independent counsel 
were limited in scope and time.21 The majority also emphasized that the independent counsel 
had no power to make policy decisions.22 The independent counsel was required to act in 
accordance with the policies of the Department of Justice.23 
The most recent of the Supreme Court decisions on the removal power was the 2010 opinion of 
a five-Justice majority in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.24 
The majority held that the for cause limit on the power of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to remove a member of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) unconstitutionally limits the power of the president to perform the functions vested in 
him by Article II.  
The Free Enterprise Fund majority reasoned that two or more layers of limits on the president’s 
removal power left the president with inadequate means to exercise the powers of the chief 
executive.25 (The majority accepted the assumption of the parties that the president can only 
remove an SEC Commissioner for cause even though there is no statutory limit on the president’s 
power to remove an SEC Commissioner.)26 The majority emphasized repeatedly that PCAOB has 
the power to make policy decisions on behalf of the government.27 In a footnote the majority 
stated that the holding “does not address that subset of independent agency employees who 
serve as administrative law judges. Whether administrative law judges are necessarily ‘officers 
of the United States’ is disputed. And unlike members of the Board, many administrative law 
judges of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement functions .  .  .  .”28 
In summary, every opinion in which the Court addressed a removal issue except the opinion in 
Morrison v. Olson relied primarily on an officer’s function in deciding whether Congress could 
require the president or his immediate subordinate to state a cause for removing an officer. If 
the officer performs a quasi-judicial function, Congress can condition the president’s power to 
remove the officer by requiring the president or his agent to state a cause for removal. If the 
officer has the power to perform executive functions, Congress cannot impose such a limit on 
the president’s removal power. Even in Morrison v. Olson, the officer had no power to make 
policy decisions. The Court has never upheld a for cause limit on the president’s power to remove 
an officer who has the power to make policy decisions. 
                                                          
20 Id. at 691. 
21 Id. at 672. 
22 Id. at 671-672. 
23 Id. at 672. 
24 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
25Id. at 498-506.  
26Id. at 487.  
27 Id. at 485-86. 
28 Id. at 507 n.10. 
6 
 
II. The Recent Efforts to Reduce the Scope of Permissible Limits on the 
Removal Power 
Over the last three decades, some scholars have urged the Court to reduce the scope of the 
permissible limits on the president’s removal power in various ways.29  The opinion for a five-
Justice majority in Free Enterprise Fund was the first success the proponents have enjoyed at the 
Supreme Court in this effort. The limit announced in that opinion took the form of a prohibition 
on congressional imposition of two or more layers of for cause protection from removal for 
officers that perform executive functions, including policy making. 
Proponents of expansion of the scope of the unlimited removal power of the president are 
pressing their arguments in many other contexts, with some success in lower courts and in the 
Solicitor General’s office. Three cases illustrate this ongoing effort. 
In its 2016 decision in PHH Corporation v. Consumer Financial Protection Board,30 a two-judge 
majority of a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that the for cause limit on the president’s power to 
remove the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is unconstitutional. The 
majority reasoned that the Director has extraordinary executive power because he “unilaterally 
implements and enforces 19 federal consumer protection statutes, covering everything from 
home finance to student loans to credit cards to banking practices.”31 The majority distinguished 
Humphrey’s Executor on the basis that the FTC, like almost all other “independent agencies,” is 
headed by a multi-member body that must include at least some members who are not members 
of the president’s political party.32 The panel argued that a single agency head has so much 
greater power than a member of a multi-member agency that the agency head must be 
removable at will by the president to ensure that the president is politically accountable for the 
actions of the agency.33  
The en banc D.C. Circuit overruled the panel in 2018.34 The en banc majority rejected the 
distinction the panel drew between agencies headed by a single director and agencies headed by 
a multi-member body. The majority held that the case was governed by the holding in 
Humphrey’s Executor. Two concurring opinions issued on behalf of three of the judges who joined 
the majority demonstrate, however, that the judges who joined the majority differed with 
respect to some of the underlying reasoning.  
                                                          
29 E.g., Steven Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541, 593-99 
(1994).  
30 839 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
31 Id. at 7. 
32 Id. at 8-9, 15-16. 
33 Id. at 36. 
34 PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F. 3d 75 (2018). 
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In one of the concurring opinions, two judges emphasized that their agreement with the majority 
was based on the “significant adjudicatory functions” that the agency performs. 35Those judges 
expressed the belief that the Framers of the constitution and the Justices who wrote the opinion 
in Humphrey’s Executor “recognized that adjudication poses a special circumstance.”36 Officers 
who adjudicate disputes between the government and individuals should not be subject to 
complete control by the executive.   
Another judge concurred only because he interpreted the requirement that the president state 
a cause for removing the Director to allow the president to remove the Director because the 
president disagreed with a policy adopted by the Director.37 Because of that easy-to-satisfy 
interpretation of for cause, the judge reasoned that the for cause limit left the president with 
enough authority to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. 
In its 2018 opinion in Collins v. Mnuchin,38 a two-judge majority of a panel of the Fifth Circuit used 
reasoning similar to the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit panel in PHH as the basis for its holding that 
the statute that requires the president to state a cause for removing the Director of the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency is unconstitutional. 
Finally, the effort to increase the scope of the president’s removal power has enjoyed success in 
the office of the Solicitor General (SG). In his 2018 brief in Lucia v. Securities & Exchange 
Commission, the SG argued that the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that limits an 
agency’s power to remove an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is unconstitutional unless it can be 
interpreted to allow removal for virtually any reason. 39       
III. The Court’s Efforts to Expand the Scope of Permissible Limits on 
the Removal Power  
Three of the five Supreme Court precedents discussed in section I, and all of the recent proposed 
reductions in scope of the permissible limits on the removal power discussed in section II involve 
only one issue. The sole question in each was whether Congress can limit the power of the 
president or his immediate subordinates to remove an officer by stating a cause for removal 
without unconstitutionally interfering with the president’s exercise of the executive powers 
vested in him by Section II of the constitution. 
One of the precedents discussed in section I involved a limit imposed by the Court itself, however. 
In Wiener, the Court held that the president could not remove a member of the War Claims 
Tribunal without stating a cause even though Congress did not impose any statutory limit on the 
                                                          
35 Id. at 113-16. 
36 Id. at 115-16. 
37 Id. at 124-37. 
38 ____F. 3d ____(5th Cir. 2018). 
39 Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners, in Lucia v. SEC, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 17-130, pp. 39-56 (Feb. 2018).  
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president’s power to remove a member of the Tribunal.40 The Court did not make the basis for 
its holding explicit but the context in which the issue arose and the Court’s discussion of the need 
for such a limit strongly suggests that the basis was due process. The Court analogized the 
function of the Tribunal to that of a District Court and referred to the need for an adjudicatory 
body that is “entirely free from the control, or coercive influence [of the president], direct or 
indirect.”41 
Another of the precedents discussed in section II included recognition of a limit on the president’s 
removal power that was not imposed by Congress. In Free Enterprise Fund,42 the Court held that 
the statutory limit on the power of the SEC to remove a member of the PCAOB was 
unconstitutional because it would create two layers of for cause insulation between the 
president and members of the PCAOB. The Court reasoned that two or more layers of insulation 
impermissibly interferes with the president’s power to perform the functions that Article II vest 
in him.43  
Of course, the holding in Free Enterprise Fund follows from the Court’s reasoning only if there is 
a for cause limit on the president’s power to remove a member of the SEC. There is no such 
statutory limit. The Court provided no explanation for its apparent belief that the president can 
only remove SEC Commissioners for cause. It stated only that the parties agreed with respect to 
that critical issue and that the Court “decide[d] the case with that understanding.”44                   
During the 1950s, the Supreme Court issued three opinions in which it expanded the scope of 
limits on the president’s removal power. In each case Congress had not limited the president’s 
removal power, but the Court imposed such a limit. The Court did not explicitly state the basis 
for each limit, but the context in which each case was decided suggests strongly that the basis 
was due process. 
Each of the three cases involved the question whether an agency was required to apply the 
restrictions on removal of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) that Congress had included in the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).45 In each case, the Court held that an agency was 
required to apply the restrictions on removal even though the APA did not apply to the agency. 
A brief description of the relevant provisions of the APA will aid in understanding the holdings. 
Congress enacted the APA to respond to numerous claims by regulated firms that agency ALJs 
(then called hearing examiners) conducted hearings in ways that reflected the ALJs’ bias in favor 
of agencies and against regulated firms.46 Studies supported the claims of systemic bias.47 
                                                          
40 357 U.S. at 355-56. 
41 Id. at 355. 
42 561 U.S. 477. 
43 Id. at 498-506. 
44 Id. at 487. 
45 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).  
46 Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953). 
47 Id. at 131. 
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Congress responded to the claims of ALJ bias by including in the APA several provisions that were 
designed to reduce the risk that ALJs would conduct hearings in ways that reflected pro-
agency/anti-regulated firm bias.48 The most important of those provisions prohibit an agency 
from assigning an ALJ any function that is inconsistent with the ALJ’s adjudicative 
responsibilities49 and a provision that limits an agency’s power to remove or otherwise punish an 
ALJ.50 If an agency is subject to the APA, an ALJ who works for the agency can only be removed if 
a separate agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board, finds that there is cause to remove the 
ALJ. 
The sections of the APA that insure the independence of ALJs do not apply to all agencies, 
however. Congress makes the decision whether to apply the relevant sections of the APA on an 
agency-by-agency basis. Thus, when Congress did not apply the APA provision that limits the 
power of an agency to remove an ALJ to a particular agency, the Court had to decide whether 
such a limit applies to the agency independent of the scope of the APA. 
In Wong Yong Sun v. McGrath,51 the question was whether the APA provisions that limit an 
agency’s power to remove ALJs applies to the administrative judges (AJs) who preside in 
deportation proceedings. The Court held that they do even though no statute made them 
applicable to such proceedings.  
 The Court began by describing the widespread complaints of bias that led to the 
enactment of the APA and to its treatment of hearing examiners as independent of the agencies 
at which they preside.52 It also referred to the many studies that had substantiated those 
complaints and that had urged statutory changes to reduce the pro-agency bias.53 It then 
described the years of study and deliberation that led to enactment of the APA by unanimous 
votes in both Houses of Congress. The Court summarized the process through which the APA was 
enacted: “The Act thus represents a long period of study and strife; it settles long-continued and 
hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces 
have come to rest.”54  
The Court then identified the primary purposes of the adjudication provisions of the APA:  
 
Of the several administrative evils sought to be cured or minimized, only two are 
particularly relevant to issues before us today. One purpose was to introduce greater 
uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among the diverse 
agencies whose customs had departed widely from each other.  .  . .     
  
                                                          
48 Id. at 131-32. 
49 5 U.S.C. §3105. 
50 5 U.S.C. §7521. 
51 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
52 Id. at 36-38. 
53 Id. at 38-45. 
54 Id. at 40. 
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More fundamental, however, was the purpose to curtail and change the practice of 
embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge.55  
 
The Court then compared the unfair and biased hearing that the government had provided the 
immigrant in the case before the Court with the hearing before an impartial hearing examiner 
that the APA requires.56 The Court suggested that the Constitution compels an agency to use the 
APA hearing procedures: 
 
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process of law derives from the same 
source as Congress’ power to legislate and, where applicable, permeates every valid 
enactment of that body.57  
 
The Court also reasoned as follows: 
 
We would hardly attribute to Congress a purpose to be less scrupulous about the fairness 
of a hearing necessitated by the Constitution than one granted by it as a matter of 
expediency. 
  
Indeed, to so construe the Immigration Act might again bring it into constitutional 
jeopardy. When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a 
tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality.58  
 
The Court concluded that the APA represented an effort by Congress to set forth the “currently 
prevailing standards of impartiality” and thereby to codify the minimum requirements of due 
process.59 Based on that conclusion, the Court held that the provisions of the APA that insulate 
ALJs from potential sources of bias apply to deportation proceedings.60 In later cases, the Court 
relied on the reasoning in Wong Yang Sung as the basis to hold that the APA applies to hearings 
under the Interstate Commerce Act, Riss & Co. v. U.S.61, and to Post Office fraud hearings, Cates 
v. Haderlein.62 
 
Congress disagreed with the Court in the case of immigration judges. Congress amended the 
Immigration Act by making it explicit that the restriction on removal of ALJs in the APA do not 
apply to immigration judges. Faced with a direct conflict between its views and those of Congress 
the Court backed down. In Marcello v. Bonds, the Court retreated from its holding in Wong Yong 
                                                          
55 Id. at 41. 
56 Id. at 45-53. 
57 Id. at 49. 
58 Id. at 50. 
59 Id. at 50. 
60 Id. at 51. 
61 341 U.S. 907 (1951). 
62 342 U.S. 804 (1952). 
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Sun and upheld the congressional decision to allow the immigration agency to remove 
immigration judges without stating a cause for removal.63 
 
III. The Court Should Use a Functional Approach in Determining the 
Scope of the Power to Remove 
 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise Fund64 and the elevation of the author of 
the D.C. Circuit panel’s 2016 opinion in PHH to the Supreme Court65 foreshadow changes in the 
scope of the removal power in the near future. As the Court makes decisions about the scope of 
the removal power it should attempt to minimize the adverse effects of each decision on two 
important and potentially conflicting constitutional imperatives—the ability of the president to 
perform effectively the powers vested in him by Article II and the need to protect the due process 
rights of parties who litigate against the government in cases that are resolved by agencies. The 
Court’s opinions support a purely functional approach to the scope question.         
In Myers, the Court described persuasively and in detail why the Justices agreed with 
Madison and the other Framers and with the First Congress that the executive power vested in 
the president must include the power to remove any executive officer:  
 
The debates in the Constitutional Convention indicated an intention to create a strong executive, and after a 
controversial discussion the executive power of the government was vested in one person and many of his 
important functions were specified so as to avoid the humiliating weakness of the Congress during the 
Revolution and under the Articles of Confederation.  
Mr. Madison and his associates in the discussion in the House dwelt at length upon the necessity there was 
for construing article 2 to give the President the sole power of removal in his responsibility for the conduct 
of the executive branch, and enforced this by emphasizing his duty expressly declared in the third section of 
the article to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’ The vesting of the executive power in the 
President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided could 
not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. This view has since been 
repeatedly affirmed by this court. As he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed, 
the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his executive power he 
should select those who were to act for him under his direction in the execution of the laws. The further 
implication must be, in the absence of any express limitation respecting removals that as his selection of 
administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be his power of removing 
those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible. It was urged that the natural meaning of the term 
‘executive power’ granted the President included the appointment and removal of executive subordinates. If 
such appointments and removals were not an exercise of the executive power, what were they? They certainly 
were not the exercise of legislative or judicial power in government as usually understood.66 
 
The Free Enterprise majority repeated much of the discussion in Myers and tied the removal 
power to political accountability: 
                                                          
63 349 U.S. 302 (1955). 
64 561 U.S. 477. 
65 Judge Kavanaugh wrote the panel opinion in PHH v. CFPB, 839 F. 3d 1. He was confirmed as an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court on _____.  
66 272 U.S. 52, 116-17 (references omitted). 
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The diffusion of power [among officers of the United States] carries with it a diffusion of accountability. The 
people do not vote for the “Officers of the United States.” They instead look to the President to guide the 
“assistants or deputies ... subject to his superintendence.” Without a clear and effective chain of command, 
the public cannot “determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of 
pernicious measures ought really to fall.” That is why the Framers sought to ensure that “those who are 
employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be 
preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President, 
and the President on the community.”67 
 
The Court has always distinguished adjudicative functions from executive functions, however. 
Thus, in Myers the Court discussed at some length the conflicting opinions of judges and Justices 
with respect to the power of the president to remove a non-Article III judge. It referred with 
apparent approval the opinion of Justice McLean: 
 
He pointed out that the argument upon which the decision rested was based on the necessity for presidential 
removals in the discharge by the President of his executive duties and his taking care that the laws be 
faithfully executed, and that such an argument could not apply to the judges, over whose judicial duties he 
could not properly exercise any supervision or control after their appointment and confirmation.68 
The Court then disavowed any intent to apply its reasoning or holding in Myers to non-Article III 
judges: 
The question *   *    * whether Congress may provide for his removal in some other way present considerations 
different from those which apply in the removal of executive officers, and therefore we do not decide them.69 
The Court followed its dicta in Myers with its clear holding in Humphrey’s that Congress can 
require the president to state a cause for removing an officer who has no executive functions and 
whose responsibilities are “quasi-judicial.”70 In Wiener the Court took the further step of holding 
that the president must state a cause for removing an officer whose duties are judicial in nature 
whether or not Congress has so limited the president’s removal power.71 
The Court issued its most detailed and most persuasive opinion on this point in Wong Yong Sun v. 
McGrath. The opinion begins with a description of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and 
the evils it addressed:  
Multiplication of federal administrative agencies and expansion of their functions to include 
adjudications which have serious impact on private rights has been one of the dramatic legal 
developments of the past half-century. *  *  * The conviction developed, particularly within the 
legal profession, that this power was not sufficiently safeguarded and sometimes was put to 
arbitrary and biased use.  
Concern over administrative impartiality and response to growing discontent was reflected in 
Congress as early as 1929, when Senator Norris introduced a bill to create a separate 
administrative court. Fears and dissatisfactions increased as tribunals grew in number and 
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jurisdiction, and a succession of bills offering various remedies appeared in Congress. Inquiries 
into the practices of state agencies, which tended to parallel or follow the federal pattern, were 
instituted in several states, and some studies noteworthy for thoroughness, impartiality and 
vision resulted.72  
The Court then summarized the seventeen years in which Congress and numerous other 
institutions had studied the evils that Congress and the Court recognized.73 The Court 
characterized the provisions of the APA that were designed to provide a right to a fair and 
impartial hearing before an unbiased adjudicative officer as the most important safeguards that 
Congress provided in the APA.74 The most important of those provisions forbid an agency from 
assigning an adjudicative officer any task other than presiding in adjudicative hearings75 and limit 
the power of an agency to remove an ALJ. The provision that limits the removal power is now 
codified at 5 U.S.C. §7521. It limits the power to remove an ALJ by specifying that an ALJ can be 
removed or otherwise disciplined only as a result of a finding of cause made by the Merit Systems 
Protection Board after a formal hearing. 
The Court then turned to the question before it. Is the immigration Service required to provide a 
hearing before an adjudicative officer who is subject to the APA safeguards of impartiality? The 
Court described the obviously biased hearing the Immigration Service had provided and found 
“the administrative hearing a perfect exemplification of the practices so unanimously 
condemned.”76  
The Court admitted that the relevant provisions of the APA did not apply to immigration hearings 
based solely on a literal parsing of the language of the statute.77 It used constitutional reasoning 
to support its holding that “deportation proceedings must conform to the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act if resulting orders are to have legal validity.”78 The Court 
questioned whether the Immigration Act would be constitutional if it was not interpreted to 
require hearings that comply with the APA safeguards that are designed to ensure that president 
officers are unbiased: 
Indeed, to so construe the Immigration Act might again bring it into constitutional jeopardy. When 
the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a tribunal which meets at 
least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. A deportation hearing involves issues basic to 
human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be 
returned, perhaps to life itself. It might be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional 
standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the like of which has been 
condemned by Congress as unfair even where less vital matters of property rights are at stake.79 
Shortly after the Court issued its opinion in Wong Yong Sun, Congress enacted a new immigration 
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statute in which Congress rejected the Court’s strong suggestion that due process requires 
immigration judges to be insulated from potential removal in the same way that the APA 
insulates ALJs from potential removal—by allowing removal only for cause determined by the 
Merit Systems Protection Board after a hearing. Congress pointedly refused to limit the 
immigration agency’s power to remove an immigration in any way. The Court then backed down 
and upheld the new immigration statute in its 1955 decision in Marcello v. Bonds.80 
As it reconsiders the scope of the removal power, the Court should establish and implement a 
clear, bright-line rule that is based on the functional distinctions that the Court has always 
recognized. The president or his immediate subordinate must have the power to remove any 
officer who has the power to make binding policy decisions on behalf of the government. That is 
the context in which political accountability is most important. It follows that the president must 
have the power to remove any policy making officer in order to execute the functions vested in 
him by Article II, including the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
By contrast, no one, including the president, should have the power to remove without cause 
any officer whose sole responsibility is to adjudicate disputes between individuals and the 
government. That is the context in which due process requires a decision maker who is not 
subject to potential removal by the president or his agent. As the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized, conferring the power to remove an officer on any individual or institution creates a   
“here and now subservience.”81 It is intolerable for an agent of the executive to have the power 
to remove an officer with responsibility to adjudicate disputes between individuals and the 
government. That is fundamentally unfair to private parties. 
That bright line rule would render unconstitutional the for cause limits on the power to remove 
members of PCAOB or the FHFA—the issues the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit addressed 
recently. Both agencies have significant policy making power. 
By contrast, the for cause limit on the power to remove ALJs would survive scrutiny under Article 
II because ALJs have no power to make policy decisions that bind the government. They have 
only the power to preside in adjudicatory hearings to resolve disputes between private parties 
and the government. Indeed, due process requires such a limit on the removal power even when 
Congress has not imposed a limit by statute, as the Court implicitly recognized in Wiener and Free 
Enterprise Fund and strongly suggested in Wong Yong Sun. 
That constitutionally-compelled limit on the removal power should apply to any officer whose 
sole responsibility is to adjudicate disputes between private individuals and the government, 
including immigration judges. The Court should overrule its holding in Marcello v. Bonds based 
on the powerful reasoning in its opinion in Wong Yong Sun. Deportation often has devastating 
effects on immigrants, including a high probability that the deported immigrant will be killed 
upon his forced return to his country of origin. There is no context in which it is more important 
to insure that officers with adjudicative responsibilities are able to perform their duties without 
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fear that they will be removed if they do not act in accordance with any biases that the president 
or his subordinates might have with respect to members of any ethnic or religious group. 
The power to enforce the law, like the power to make policy decisions on behalf of the 
government, is a core executive function. It follows that the president or his immediate 
subordinates must have the power to remove the vast majority of officers with the power to 
enforce federal law. That leaves only the issue that the Court addressed in Morrison v. Olson. 
Should Congress have the discretion to insulate from the president’s removal power an 
investigator/prosecutor whose sole responsibility is to investigate and potentially to prosecute 
the president or those senior members of his administration who are identified with the 
president? 
That is a difficult question. It is possible to defend such a congressional decision based on a due 
process based principle that has been a feature of the Anglo-American legal system for many 
centuries—no one should be a judge in his own case.82 On the other hand, experience to date 
suggests that the political limits on removal in this context may well be sufficient alone to insure 
that the president does not abuse the removal power in this context. President Nixon abused the 
removal power by removing a special counsel who was about to make public powerful evidence 
that the president committed a crime and was forced to resign in disgrace. By contrast, President 
Clinton did not attempt to remove the special prosecutor who made public his criminal conduct 
and survived the attempt to remove him from office.                                                                                     
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